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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
Steinmeier Visits 
Khartoum
Seizing the Opportunity for  
Sudan’s Transition
Sudan’s transition process offers 
 chances for conflict prevention and 
stabilization – core objectives of Ger-
many’s foreign policy in Africa. The 
 international attention surrounding 
a visit by German President Frank- 
Walter Steinmeier to Khartoum in late 
February 2020 gives the civilian side 
of  Sudan’s transitional government a 
golden opportunity to push forward 
difficult reforms. Germany should sup-
port these efforts and the transition 
process through diplomacy, mediation, 
and development cooperation.
On February 27 and 28, 2020, German 
President Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
will visit Khartoum, the capital of the 
Republic of Sudan. It will be the first 
such trip by a German president since 
1985. Steinmeier will also be one of the 
most senior leaders to visit the city at 
the confluence of the White and Blue 
Nile since the start of the Sudanese 
revolution in December 2018. While 
 Steinmeier’s role is largely ceremonial, 
his visit reflects intense diplomatic en-
gagement by the German government 
in Sudan’s transition process.
A sustained partnership presents 
 opportunities for both countries. The 
 civilian side of the Sudanese transi-
tional government needs principled 
international support as leverage in its 
relations with the country’s  security 
forces and to deliver on its promises 
to improve the lives of its population. 
Germany – based on its own histori-
cal and contemporary experience with 
transition processes – can help  provide 
that support. For Germany, leadership 
on Sudan is a chance to prove how se-
riously it takes its recent commitment 
to facilitating conflict prevention, sta-
bilization, and peace promotion in its 
foreign policy.
THE CIVIL-MILITARY 
GOVERNMENT NEEDS 
LEGITIMACY
Since August 2019, a civil-military 
transitional government has ruled Su-
dan. So far, cooperation between the 
Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), 
the broad civilian coalition supporting 
the government, and the country’s se-
curity forces seems to be working – as 
both sides continue to emphasize. The 
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partnership works because both sides 
need each other. On the one hand, 
the security forces – which include 
not only the Sudanese Armed  Forces, 
but also the Rapid Support Forces 
(RSF) headed by General  Mohammed 
 Hamdan Daglo, also known as  Hemeti 
– control large swathes of the econ-
omy, possess excellent relations with 
important Arab countries, and play a 
leading role in the negotiations with 
armed groups. On the other hand, 
though, they lack exactly what Suda-
nese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, 
his cabinet, and the FFC bring to the 
table. The government needs the sup-
port of the unions, professional asso-
ciations, political parties, and social 
movements that make up the civilian 
revolutionary coalition for domestic 
legitimacy. Since many Western gov-
ernments shun Hemiti and the RSF, 
the same holds true internationally. In-
deed, opposition parties in Germany’s 
legislature, the Bundestag, have called 
on the federal government to ensure 
that renewed development cooper-
ation would not entail the training of 
Sudanese security forces.
The cooperation between the FFC and 
security forces is not, however, as sta-
ble as it seems. Events in recent weeks 
show that threats to the partnership 
can emerge at anytime. On February 
19, 2020, people took to the streets 
to protest the dismissal of junior mil-
itary officers who had joined the rev-
olution early on. The police in Khar-
toum, whose chief was appointed by 
the government of former President 
Omar al-Bashir, cracked down on the 
demonstration with tear gas and ba-
tons, injuring 53 people in the process. 
In reaction, Prime Minister Hamdok 
created a commission of inquiry head-
ed by the attorney general.
Such incidents risk derailing the foun-
dation of civil-military cooperation in 
the transitional government. People 
in Khartoum are eagerly awaiting the 
results of another commission of in-
quiry set up to investigate the violent 
crackdown on a sit-in held on June 3, 
2019, in which more than 120 people 
were killed and more than 900 injured. 
While the RSF is widely believed to 
have been responsible for this carnage, 
it remains unclear whether the civil-
ian government will have the strength 
to hold senior RSF leaders accountable 
when the commission names them in 
its report.
DIFFICULT DECISIONS 
LIE AHEAD
Trade-offs and painful decisions are a 
natural part of any democratic process 
of transition – especially after thir-
ty years of dictatorship. Despite Su-
dan’s “revolutionary” narrative, many 
parts of its old system and members 
of its former government remain in 
place. The transformation of the coun-
try’s political, economic, and social 
spheres will require continued pres-
sure from the streets and internation-
al diplomacy.
Prime Minister Hamdok can point to 
domestic and international expecta-
tions in his daily negotiations with the 
security forces. His government has al-
ready shown its willingness to address 
contentious issues. In November 2019, 
it dissolved former President Bashir’s 
National Congress Party and repealed 
his government’s public order law, 
which had severely restricted the role 
of women in public life. In February 
2020, the government announced its 
willingness to cooperate with the In-
ternational Criminal Court, which has 
indicted Bashir and four other former 
officials for atrocities in Darfur.
More tough decisions await. The gov-
ernment has promised to improve 
the education, health care, and liveli-
hoods of ordinary Sudanese. In 2019, 
three million children in Sudan were 
not in school, for example. Today, most 
people in Khartoum have to wait for 
24 hours at petrol stations to access 
heavily subsidized fuel and queue in 
bakeries for bread made from subsi-
dized wheat. International donors have 
indicated their willingness to support 
Sudan’s economic development, but 
they expect more detailed proposals 
for macroeconomic reforms – includ-
ing the outline of a social safety net to 
cushion the gradual lifting of such ex-
pensive subsidies. The government 
postponed a decision on a complete 
budget until a national economic con-
ference in March 2020 because it has 
not yet been able to agree on the ques-
tion of subsidies with the FFC, which 
demands that they remain in place for 
now while the government reduces 
military expenditure and military con-
trol of the economy instead.
AN APPROACH GUIDED BY 
RESPECT AND EMPATHY
Steinmeier’s visit to Khartoum is 
the climax of a month of extraordi-
nary German-Sudanese interaction. 
On February 13, 2020, the Bundestag 
passed a resolution asking the German 
government to restart bilateral devel-
Sudan’s transformation will require  
continued pressure from the  
streets and international diplomacy
Steinmeier Visits Khartoum
3No. 5 | February 2020
COMMENTARY
opment cooperation with Sudan. Gerd 
Müller, federal minister for econom-
ic cooperation and development, who 
had been in Khartoum the week be-
fore, announced an initial package of 
80 million euro for this year with pos-
sible focus on vocational training, agri-
culture, energy, and good governance.
The timing was perfect. A mere twen-
ty-four hours later, Prime Minister 
Hamdok met German Chancellor An-
gela Merkel in Berlin. At a joint press 
appearance following their meeting, 
both leaders emphasized this pivot-
al moment for further reforms in the 
country at the wider Horn of Arica. 
Merkel pledged to “do everything to 
use this historical window of opportu-
nity.” Hamdok spoke of an “emerging 
success story” and how a successful 
transition in Sudan could have a “spill-
over effect in the entire region.”
Germany can also bring its own his-
torical experience to bear on its rela-
tionship with Sudan. Both German and 
Sudanese leaders have drawn anal-
ogies between the peaceful revolu-
tion of 1989 in the German Democrat-
ic Republic and the Sudanese uprising 
three decades later. Clearly, the two 
processes differ in important ways. 
Still, Germans are aware of the tra-
vails associated with accounting for 
state crimes, healing a divided soci-
ety, and ensuring inclusive econom-
ic recovery. They increasingly recog-
nize that mistakes were made in their 
own process of reunification and that 
difficulties remain. If the German gov-
ernment can call upon this experience 
in its dealings with Sudan’s transition 
process, it can interact with the coun-
try on slightly more equal footing than 
other international partners. This ap-
proach should also guide President 
 Steinmeier’s interactions with his Su-
danese interlocutors: Germany doesn’t 
have all the answers, but it has some 
experience with asking the right ques-
tions in dealing with an authoritarian 
past.
WHAT GERMANY 
CAN CONTRIBUTE
Germany can contribute to Sudan’s 
transition process in three areas: 
 diplomacy, mediation, and develop-
ment cooperation. Diplomatically, the 
German government played an im-
portant behind-the-scenes role in ral-
lying international stakeholders  behind 
common objectives – including Gulf 
countries that initially supported a 
military takeover in April 2019. This 
group became the “Friends of Sudan,” 
the main mechanism for coordinating 
international support, which meets ev-
ery two months under a rotating chair 
to discuss the Sudanese government’s 
progress and how to respond. In Sep-
tember 2019, German Foreign Minis-
ter Heiko Maas was the first foreign 
official to visit Khartoum after Prime 
Minister Hamdok had been sworn in. 
It will now fall to German and British 
diplomats in the UN Security Council 
to draft the mandate for a follow-up 
mission to the United Nations- African 
Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID), which is scheduled to with-
draw by the end of October 2020.
Feeding into this high-level diplomacy 
is Berlin’s support of Sudan with medi-
ation. In the last years of Bashir’s gov-
ernment, Germany already backed a 
national dialogue and a mediation pro-
cess among armed groups from Darfur. 
This yielded an agreement among the 
armed groups involved just days before 
the first major anti-government pro-
tests began in December 2018 in Atba-
ra, a key industrial city in northeastern 
Sudan. When events started moving 
fast on the ground, Berlin already had 
an established list of countries with 
which it had worked on monitoring the 
mediation process to turn to for addi-
tional support. In fact, Germany con-
tinues to monitor the current peace 
negotiations in Juba, South Sudan’s 
capital. It has also offered to increase 
its mediation support again when 
needed.
In its bilateral discussions with Sudan 
on development cooperation, Germany 
will need to identify projects that can 
deliver quick results to the  population 
at large – in the areas of agriculture 
and economic livelihoods, for exam-
ple. The German government should 
ensure that international assistance 
is fully coordinated with Sudan’s ma-
jor development partners. The admin-
istrative capacities of the country’s 
 ministries are still miniscule, making it 
difficult for Sudan to develop detailed 
proposals for macroeconomic reform 
to achieve debt relief and economic 
transformation. Germany’s  approach 
to these negotiations should be  guided 
by creativity, f lexibility, and empa-
thy for the challenges of a  transitional 
government.
COURAGE AND 
PERSISTENCE BRING 
REWARDS
If Germany is serious about its com-
mitment to conflict prevention and 
stabilization in its foreign policy, it 
needs to sustain its political atten-
tion to Sudan’s transition process. As 
it knows all too well from its own his-
tory, confronting and overcoming the 
legacy of authoritarianism takes per-
sistence. The courage of the Sudanese 
people in the face of horrific violence 
and repression is a great asset in this 
struggle. Diplomats have been amazed 
at the professionalism and organiza-
tion of Sudan’s revolutionary move-
ments. As President Steinmeier will see 
for himself in Khartoum, Germany and 
Sudan can both benefit from learning 
each other’s stories.
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